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Abstract This paper uses count and binary data models with an endogenous dummy variable, and propensity
score matching to evaluate the effect of the subsidized health care program in Medellin (Colombia). The subsidized
program, which primarily covers poor people, is found to have neither a significant impact on the use of preventive
medical care nor hospitalization. However, parametric specification of preventive utilization indicates that there is
both selection and moral hazard, effects that compensated approximately. These facts imply that the program can
improve its coverage if mechanisms are created to lower the individual moral hazard effect.
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1 Introduction
Health care utilization and health insurance are intimately related because of moral hazard and self selection. The
demand for health care is conditioned by the health insurance status of the user. But, the insurance decision itself
depends upon expected future use of health services (Cameron et al., 1988). Specifically, the subsidized health
insurance program reduces the effective price of medical care; this may lead to “overutilization” by the insured
users. And, the future use of health services may induce poor people to enroll in the subsidized health insurance
program. This phenomenon is known as simultaneous equation bias or endogeneity bias. The problem is that the
error term of the medical care utilization is correlated with a switching variable that determines participation in the
program. In order to take into account simultaneous equation bias, we use count and binary models based on full
information maximum likelihood that accommodate endogenous switching because of self selection associated
with treatment effects (Terza, 1998; Amemiya, 1978). However, the semistructural models are identified through
nonlinear functional forms even if all the variables in the insurance equation are included in the utilization equa-
tions, we use traditional exclusion restrictions by specifying an instrumental variable in the subsidized equation
that is excluded from utilization equations.
Recently, a great effort has been made to provide basic health care insurance to the poor in developing countries.
In Colombia, the Philippines and Vietnam, for example, the poor are enrolled in a national social health insurance
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scheme which is financed by taxpayers. In China and Mexico, by contrast, households not covered by formal
sector programs have the option of enrolling in a separate subsidized public health insurance program (Wagstaff
et al., 2007). However, the potential gains, because of distributional effects, can be lost due to efficiency losses
caused by distortion in users’ behavior associated with moral hazard and self selection. As a result, policy makers
have to evaluate the programs in order to identify problems with their implementation.
Evaluations of subsidized health insurance programs in developing countries are generally based on propensity
score matching (Saadah et al., 2001; Trujillo et al., 2005; Urdinola and Jain, 2006; Wagstaff, 2007; Wagstaff et al.,
2007; Pita and amd A Sanz, 2008). The empirical evidence based on propensity score matching indicates that
subsidized health insurance programs have resulted in a net increase in utilization for the poor beneficiaries. Nev-
ertheless, the level of health care utilization remains low in developing countries. However, matching estimators
of treatment effects are useful when the process of selection in treatment is based on observable variables, i.e.,
the key assumption is that unobservable variables play no role in the treatment assignment and outcomes deter-
mination. This is known as conditional independence assumption (Cameron and trivedi, 2005). If the conditional
independence assumption is not met, the estimated treatment effect is biased and inconsistent. In recent years, in-
strumental variable methods have been advocated in order to account for unobserved confounding variables, i.e.,
endogeneity problems. Specifically for the Colombian case, Trujillo et al. (2005) and Gaviria et al. (2006) used
instrumental variable methods; they found that the subsidized insurance program greatly increased medical care
utilization among the country’s poor. However,
“. . . Despite the substantial increase in public expenditure on health care and the increase in the pro-
portion of population with health insurance, many problems persist. On the one hand, the implantation of
a scheme of subsidies to demand has not been accompanied by a dismantling of subsidies to supply, which
has led to a doubling in expenditure and a multiplication of inefficiencies.”
(Gaviria et al., 2006, pp 4)
These structural problems recently caused the Colombian government to declare a social emergency because of
the health care system going bankrupt.
This paper evaluates the impact of Colombia’s subsidized health insurance program on preventive health care uti-
lization and hospitalization services of Medellin’s citizens, and attempts to contribute to the more general literature
on the impact of subsidized health insurance programs implanted in developing countries.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a review of the Colombian health care systems. The method-
ology used to evaluate the impact of the subsidized health insurance on the poor in Colombia is sketched out in
section III. Section IV presents the evaluation results of the subsidized health care program in Medellin city, and
section V concludes.
2 Colombian health care systems
Up until the 80s, the Colombian health care system was based on three separate schemes: the private scheme,
which provided health services to the wealthiest segment of the population through private health insurance plans;
the public scheme, which had the task of providing health services to the poorest part of the population who were
not protected by medical insurance; and the social security scheme which aimed to provide basic health services
to two different groups of the population, the formal workers belonging to the private sector through the Social
Security Institute (Instituto de Seguridad Social) and the public sector workers through the Social Benefit Soci-
eties (Cajas de Previsio´n Social). This health care system had its boom between 1975 and 1984 but fell into decay
after that due to the fiscal crisis during 1984 that reduced the contributions assigned to this sector. Despite the
aforementioned boom, the system never achieved near acceptable goals, mainly because inequities persisted (both
between regions and strata), low levels of insurance coverage and a high inefficiency in the public provision of
health services (Gaviria et al., 2006).
During the first half of the 1990s, the Colombian government carried out profound reforms to the health care
system that reduced its participation in the industry. This allowed for regulated competition among private firms,
separated the provision of health insurance from supplying health services, and decentralized subsidized programs
for the local governments. The schemes that arose out of these reforms are a contributory social insurance program
financed with mandatory taxes, and a subsidized program aimed at covering the lowest income and the most
vulnerable of the population, financed with both local and central government resources. These reforms were based
on five principles, according to the 1993 Law 100: efficiency, universality, solidarity, integrity and participation,
which tried to achieve four objectives: increase coverage, increase solidarity through cross subsidies from the
contributive to the subsidized program, improve efficiency by allowing competition in the industry and changing
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the supply side subsidies to demand side subsidies (Congress, 1993).
The new health system required people affiliated to the contributive program to pay 12% of their income (two
thirds paid by the employer and one third by the employee), collected by an insurer chosen by the employee. The
subsidized program is financed with a constant percentage of the aforementioned contribution, transfers from the
central government and resources owned by the local governments and regional entities. The municipalities are
responsible for identifying the beneficiaries of the subsidized program, who pay a coinsurance rate in order to
rationalize the use of medical services. Additionally, there is still a supply side subsidy paid to ESS (Empresas
Solidarias de Salud), which are nonprofit medical care providers.
Compared to the reform’s explicit objectives that led to the actual health care system, this has not been successful.
It has targeting problems, due to a significant number of low income households which do not receive the benefits
from the subsidized program when some high income families do. This happens because of imperfect monitoring,
corruption and limitations in administrative capabilities to identify plausible beneficiaries. It also has coverage
problems because of the slow growth of people in the contributive program, transfers from the central government
and contributions from the regional entities (Gaviria et al., 2006). Additionally, the transition of supply side to
demand side subsidies is still incomplete, maintaining inefficiencies due to public hospitals which are not capable
of selling services, this displaying a structural deficit in their budget. Along with this, the introduction of the
subsidized program has led to a growth in the number of public hospitals, which lower the levels of occupation
resulting in an underuse of these facilities. The biggest problem of the failure to make the transition between
supply side to demand side subsidies is that the first extracts resources from the latter.
3 Methodology
Count data models have gained popularity among econometricians; specifically, health care demand has had many
contributions. Deb and trivedi (1997) developed a finite mixture Negative Binomial count model that accommo-
dates unobserved heterogeneity; Gurmu (1997) proposed a semi-parametric hurdle model for count data in order
to account for an excess of zeros, this model nests Poisson and Negative Binomial as special cases; Mullahy
(1997) suggested that a nonlinear instrumental variable strategy offers a reasonably general solution to endogene-
ity problems; Windmeijer and Santos (1997) built a count data model whose estimation is based on the generalized
method of moments for accommodating the same issue. Deb and trivedi (2004) and Deb and Trivedi (2006) de-
veloped a specification and estimation framework for a class of nonlinear, non-normal microeconometric models
of treatment and outcome with selection that is estimated through a simulated likelihood method. Finally, Munkin
and Trivedi (2008) developed a Bayesian analysis that take into account endogenous selection. On the other hand,
Amemiya (1978) proposed a class of generalized least squares estimators in the case of a simultaneous equation
generalized Probit model; Green (1996) derived the marginal effects for a conditional mean function in the bi-
variate Probit model, and extends the results to models with sample selection and heteroscedasticity; Monfardini
and Radice (2006) conducted a Monte Carlo experiment to examine the finite sample properties of maximum
likelihood inference in the bivariate Probit models with endogenous dummy. Waters (1999) used bivariate Probit
models to evaluate a publicly-financed health insurance program in Ecuador, this author finds that there is a strong
positive association with the use of curative health care, but not a significant effect on the use of preventive care.
Finally, Geweke et al. (2003) analyze an endogenous binary Probit model to study the quality of hospitals based
on mortality rates in treating pneumonia.
The basis for evaluating programs is counterfactual analysis where an outcome is observed for all individuals but
in different states. Specifically, we consider a model in which health care utilization is observed for all individuals,
but in only one of the two possible states; covered or uncovered by the subsidized program. Individuals self select
into a given program, and expected future use of preventive care and hospitalization may affect the decision to
enroll in the scheme, with the potential of causing endogeneity. Roy (1951) considered, informally, this situation
in the labor market, but in this case, the outcome variable is continuous; Maddala (1996) called it switching regres-
sion model with endogenous switching. Terza (1998) extended the framework to count data models, and Amemiya
(1978) suggested bivariate Probit models to correct endogeneity in the case of binary models.
This section follows the discussion of Terza (1998) and Miranda (2004). Consider the ith individual from a random
sample I = {1,2, . . . ,N} whose dependent variable is the number of preventive visits to the doctor in the last year
(yi = 0,1, . . . ). The conditional probability density function of the count dependent variable is Poisson with mean
equals to Exp{x′iβ+diγ+ ei}. This one depends on a vector of explanatory variables xi, a random component ei,
and a binary switching variable (di = 0,1) which indicates the state of ith individual, covered or uncovered by the
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subsidized health insurance program. Given a vector of explanatory variables zi (which may contain some or all
the elements of xi), di is characterized by an index process
di =
{
1, z′iα+ vi > 0
0, z′iα+ vi 6 0
(1)
Suppose that ei and vi are jointly Normal,[
ei
vi
]
∼ N
([
0
0
]
,
[
σ2 σρ
σρ 1
])
(2)
After some algebra and given a change of variable ηi = ei/σ
√
2, the joint conditional probability density
function of yi and di, given xi and zi, may be expressed as
f (yi,di|zi,xi) = 1√pi
∫ ∞
−∞
f (yi|zi,xi,di,
√
2σηi)[diΦ∗i (
√
2σηi)+(1−di)(1−Φ∗i (
√
2σηi))]Exp{−η2i }dηi (3)
where f (yi|zi,xi,di,
√
2σηi) is the conditional probability density function of yi given zi, xi, di and ei; Φ(.)
is the cumulative distribution function of a Normal standard variable; and Φ∗i (
√
2σηi) = Φ[
z′iα+(ρ
√
2)ηi√
1−ρ2 ]. Once
f (yi|zi,xi,di,
√
2σηi) is specified, the log-likelihood function for a sample of size N can be established. In the
Poisson version of the model
f (yi|zi,xi,di,
√
2σηi) =
Exp{x′iβ+ γdi+
√
2σηi}yiExp{−Exp{x′iβ+ γdi+
√
2σηi}}
yi!
(4)
Notice that the mean and variance of the count variable are
µi = E[yi|di,zi,xi] = Exp{x′iβ+ γdi−0.5σ}
(
di
Φ(z′iα+σρ)
Φ(z′iα)
+(1−di)1−Φ(z
′
iα+σρ)
1−Φ(z′iα)
)
(5)
and
Var(yi|di,zi,xi) = µi+ kµ2i (6)
where k = Exp(2σ2)−Exp(σ2). Thus, the model exhibits overdispersion.
The program effect can be measured by the Average Treatment Effect (ATE). This is AT E = E[yi|zi,xi,di =
1]−E[yi|zi,xi,di = 0]. Given that the mean of the process is exponential, we choose to measure the ATE as
E[yi|zi,xi,di = 1]
E[yi|zi,xi,di = 0] = Exp{γ}
(
Φ(z′iα+σρ)
Φ(z′iα)
)(
1−Φ(z′iα)
1−Φ(z′iα+σρ)
)
(7)
where Exp{γ} measures the moral hazard effect and
(
Φ(z′iα+σρ)
Φ(z′iα)
)(
1−Φ(z′iα)
1−Φ(z′iα+σρ)
)
is the selection effect based
on unobservable factors.
If ρ = 0, ei and vi are independent, then di is an exogenous process, i.e., there is not self selection under this
formulation. Thus, the parameters estimated in a exogenous count model are unbiased and consistent. Note that
in this case, the selection effect is equal to one. The model is identified through nonlinear functional form even
if all the variables in the insurance equation are included in the utilization equation. However, we use exclusion
restrictions by specifying an instrumental variable in the subsidized regimen equation.
In the case of hospitalization, we follow the discussion of Green (2003) and Miranda and Rabe-Hesketch (2006),
where yi = {0,1} is a dichotomous variable which is equal to 1 if individual i was hospitalized in the last year.
The model can be formulated as a system of equations for two latent variables (y∗i and d∗i ). The process for di is
characterized by equation (1) where d∗i = z′iα+ vi and yi is generated by
yi =
{
1, y∗i = x′iβ+diγ+ ei > 0
0, y∗i = x′iβ+diγ+ ei 6 0
(8)
A bivariate Normal distribution is assumed for vi and ei, i.e.,[
ei
vi
]
∼ N
([
0
0
]
,
[
1 ρ
ρ 1
])
(9)
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Again, the semistructural model is identified, but we introduce exclusion restrictions in order to get more robust
results. If ρ= 0 there is not self selection under this formulation, and the parameters estimated in a univariate Probit
model are unbiased and consistent.
To construct the log-likelihood, let qi1 = 2yi−1, qi2 = 2di−1, y1i = x′iβ+diγ, y2i = z′iα, wi j = qi jyi j for j = 1,2
and ρi∗ = qi1qi2ρ.
The probabilities that enter the likelihood function are
P(Y = yi,D = di|zi,xi) =Φ2(wi1,wi2,ρi∗) (10)
where Φ2 is the bivariate Normal cumulative distribution function. This expression accounts for all the neces-
sary sign changes needed to compute probabilities for yi and di equal to zero and one.
Additionally, we use propensity score matching for evaluating the subsidized health insurance program. In this
case, counterfactual analysis is based on a set of potential comparison units (controls) for whom the observable
variables, x, match those of the treated units. The concept of propensity score is useful when treatment partici-
pation is targeted to a population defined by some observable characteristics. The propensity score is defined by
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) as the conditional probability of receiving a treatment given pre-treatment charac-
teristics:
p(xi)≡ Pr{di = 1|xi}= E{di|xi} (11)
There are two assumptions that play an important role in treatment evaluation; first, the balancing condition,
which states that di ⊥ xi|p(xi), and means that for individuals with the same propensity score the assignment to
treatment is random and should look identical in terms of their xi vector. And second, the conditional independence
condition, yi ⊥ di|xi, which means that participation in the treatment program does not depend on the outcomes,
after controlling for the variation in outcomes induced by differences in xi. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) stated
that yi ⊥ di|xi⇒ yi ⊥ di|p(xi). The propensity score reduces the dimensionality problem of matching treated and
control units on the basis of the multidimensional vector xi. In implementing propensity score matching three
issues are relevant: (1) whether to match with or without replacement, (2) the number of units to use in the control
set, and (3) the choice of the matching method (Cameron and trivedi, 2005). Technically, the issue is a trade-off
of bias for efficiency. Various methods have been proposed in the literature to overcome this problem, and four
of the most widely used are Nearest Neighbor Matching, Radius Matching, Kernel Matching and Stratification
Matching (Becker and Ichino, 2002). Once the propensity score is estimated, the matching Average Treatment
Effect on Treated (ATET) can be calculated.
ÂT ET =
1
NT
∑
i∈{d=1}
{yi−∑
j
w(i, j)y j} (12)
where NT is the number of treated units (d = 1), and w(i, j) (0 < w(i, j) ≤ 1) denote the weight given to the
jth control case in making a comparison with the ith treated case. Different matching estimators are generated by
varying the choice of w(i, j).
4 Econometric Results
The models are estimated using data from the Medellin Living Standards Survey (ECV/2007). ECV is a cross-
section representative survey of the non-institutionalized population in Medellin with excellent information on
demographic and socioeconomic characteristics and health status. Out of a sample of 14,145 individuals that can
freely choose to be in the subsidized program, 10,074 of them are in the program. As can be seen in Table (1),
there is no statistical difference in the unconditional mean of the amount of preventive medical care utilization and
hospitalization between covered and uncovered individuals. On the other hand, 1.8% and 13.5% of agents in the
program have bad and regular self denominated health status, respectively. The program is focused on older and
female individuals. As illustrated, the program is concentrated on low strata people, i.e., the poor of the popula-
tion. The relative frequency distribution by program of preventive medical care utilization, given in percentages,
is shown in Table (2). There is not much difference between individuals covered and uncovered by the subsidized
program. Table (3) depicts that 14.8% of the observations are equal to zero, and the cumulative relative frequency
until four visits is 98.3%. Probably, there is unconditional overdispersion in data because of the long right tail (the
maximum number of preventive care visits is 64) and the unconditional variance is 3.71, which is greater than the
mean that is 2.51. The mean of preventive health utilization for covered and uncovered users are 2.52 and 2.49,
respectively.
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We estimate a count data model with endogenous switching where the count variable is the number of preven-
tive medical care visits in the last year and the switching variable is belonging to subsidized program. We control
by age, gender, own perceived health status and strata. In general, all estimated coefficients have the expected
sign and an intuitive statistical significance, for both count and switching variables (See Table (4)). We use the
ratio between time living in the neighborhood and age as an identifying instrument in order to get more robust
outcomes, although the model is identified through the functional form. Gaviria et al. (2006) used this variable as
an instrument in their article, and demonstrate that it is a valid instrument in a linear context. Because there is no
formal test for the validity of exclusion restrictions in a nonlinear setting such as ours, our checks of instrument
relevance and exogeneity are informal. As can be seen, a high fraction on time living in the neighborhood implies a
bigger probability of being in the subsidized program, an intuitive result because people with high fraction would
increase the probability of being identified as beneficiaries of the subsidized program by the municipality. We
conduct a likelihood ratio test for significance of the instrument, the test statistic is 137.68 which is large relative
to conventional 95% critical value for χ2c(1).
Table 1: Descriptive statistics: Medellin 2007.
Variable Subsidized Regimen No Subsidized Regimen
Nvisit 2.52 2.49
(1.82) (2.15)
Hosp 0.034 0.023
(0.18) (0.15)
Age 35.1 28.5
(20.69) (17.72)
Gender 0.59 0.46
(0.49) (0.49)
Hstatus1 0.018 0.005
(0.13) (0.07)
Hstatus2 0.135 0.071
(0.34) (0.25)
Hstatus3 0.76 0.82
(0.42) (0.38)
Hstatus4 0.082 0.10
(0.27) (0.30)
Stratum1 0.24 0.16
(0.42) (0.37)
Stratum2 0.62 0.38
(0.48) (0.48)
Stratum3 0.12 0.36
(0.33) (0.48)
Stratum4 0 0.046
(0.00) (0.21)
Stratum5 0 0.025
(0.00) (0.15)
Stratum6 0 0.008
(0.00) (0.089)
Ylive 0.53 0.51
(0.40) (0.42)
Nvisit: Medical appointments per year, Hosp: Hospitalization in the last year, Stratum1: Under-Lower stratum,
Stratum2:Lower stratum, Stratum3:Medium-Low strata, Stratum4: Average strata, Stratum5: Medium-High strata,
Stratum6: High, Hstatus1: Poor health status,Hstatus2: Near poor health status, Hstatus3: Good health status,
Hstatus4: Very good health status, Gender: 1-Female, 0-Male, SP: 1-Covered Subsidized Regimen, 0-Uncovered
Subsidized Regimen, Ylive: Years living in the neighborhood/Age.
Source: Authors’ estimations
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Table 2: Preventive Health Care Visits: Observed Frequencies by Program, Medellin 2007.
Subsidized Regimen No Subsidized Regimen
Medical appointments Percent Frequency Percent Frequency
per year
0 13.67 1,377 17.69 720
1 22.27 2,247 17.78 724
2 8.67 873 11.67 475
3 16.10 1,622 15.48 630
4 37.98 3,826 34.73 1,414
More than 4 1.28 129 2.65 108
Source: Authors’ estimations
In order to test endogeneity a preliminary z statistic can be used to test ρ = 0, as can be seen in the second
column of Table (4), ρ is statistically significant at 5%. We estimate a model with the restriction ρ = 0 and
perform a likelihood ratio test, χ2c(1) = −2 ∗ (−35055.472− (−34986.633)) = 116. Thus, the adequacy of the
endogenous switching specification is supported by the rejection of the null hypothesis ρ = 0 at any standard
confidence level (Pr ≥ χ2c(1) = 0).1 Using equation (7), we calculate the Average Treatment Effect (ATE). The
result indicates that there is a mean Ex-post moral hazard of 211.11%, but a favourable selection effect of 47.11%,
i.e., the unobservable factors that increase the probability of being enrolled in the subsidized program also led to
lower utilization relative to those randomly assigned into the subsidized regime. These effects compensate them
approximately.
Table 3: Preventive Health Care Visits: Observed and Fitted Frequencies, Medellin 2007.
Observed Percent Expected Percent Expected Percent
Poisson model Negative binomial model
Medical appointments Percent Frequency Mean % Std. Dev Mean % Std. Dev
per year
0 14.83 2,097 8.51 0.012 11.39 0.013
1 20.98 2,967 20.33 0.019 21.50 0.015
2 9.53 1,348 25.46 0.008 22.96 0.005
3 15.92 2,252 21.34 0.006 18.27 0.004
4 37.07 5,240 13.46 0.012 12.05 0.008
More than 4 1.70 241 11.23 0.021 13.80 0.021
Source: Authors’ estimations
As is depicted in Table (4), there is simultaneous equation bias in exogenous Poisson and Binomial Negative
models that causes the variable subsidized regime not to be statistically significant at 5% level. According to results
in the second column in Table (4), σ is positive and significantly different from zero. Therefore, there is evidence
that overdispersion and unobserved heterogeneity are present. This evidence is supported by the Binomial Negative
model. As is well known, the excess of zeros cannot be handled by a Poisson model, an outcome that is supported
in Table (3), where we compare the actual and fitted frequencies for a different number of preventive doctor visits.
We observe that the Poisson regression seriously underpredicts the proportion of zero visits and overestimates the
proportion of positive visits. As shown in Table (3), fitted frequencies of Negative Binomial model are nearer to
actual frequencies than fitted frequencies of the Poisson model.
1 Note that under the null hypothesis ρ lies in the boundary of the set of its admissible values. Thus, the likelihood-ratio statistic is distributed
as a 50:50 mixture of a mass point at zero and a chi-squared variable with one degree of freedom.
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Table 4: Estimated Models: Preventive Health Care Utilization, Medellin 2007.
Endogenous Poisson Model (ρ 6= 0) Exogenous Poisson Model Negative binomial model Probit model
Coef (s.d) Coef (s.d) Coef (s.d) Coef (s.d)
Variables Nvisit Nvisit Nvisit
Age 0.0044231* (0.0012791) 0.0060889*(0.0012542) 0.0060902*(0.0012615)
Gender -0.0959222*(0.0139889) -0.0184223(0.0127698) -0.0181572(0.0127978)
Age2 -0.0000961*(0.0000159) -0.0000855*(0.0000167) -0.0000856*(0.0000168)
Hstatus2 -0.124752(0.0907661) -0.1261603(0.0908463) -0.124752(0.0907661)
Hstatus3 0.02332(0.0567404) -0.1116166(0.0885423) -0.111017(0.0883978)
Hstatus4 0.1671627*(0.0605137) 0.015652(0.0893371) 0.0159575(0.0891615)
Stratum2 -0.0156933(0.0167357) 0.0479041*(0.0158439) 0.0473426*(0.0158743)
Stratum3 0.1901979*(0.0226834) -0.0055951(0.0213796) -0.0061661(0.0214525)
SR 0.7474637*(0.0331389) 0.008389(0.0171163) 0.0078736(0.0171893)
Intercept 0.3171489*(0.0664424) 0.9276507*(0.0914805) 0.9276467*(0.091397)
SR SR
Age 0.007016*(0.0022526) 0.0066102*(0.0023808)
Gender 0.3209827*(0.023273) 0.3187319*(0.0235869)
Age2 0.0000599*(0.0000286) 0.0000605*(0.0000312)
Hstatus2 -0.4033499*(0.1311738) -0.3063945*(0.1286992)
Hstatus3 -0.6690486*(0.1274869) -0.5328867*(0.1246742)
Hstatus4 -0.7475981*(0.1324188) -0.5732186*(0.1300383)
Stratum2 0.2295052*(0.0279194) 0.2661917*(0.0285102)
Stratum3 -0.7486271*(0.0337093) -0.7404144*(0.033759)
Ylive 0.3206878*(0.0263201) 0.1514044*(0.0292171)
Intercept 0.5891571*(0.1344295) 0.5485757*(0.1316716)
σ 0.490351*(0.013541)
ρ -0.9111115*(0.0174774)
Nvisit: Medical appointments per year, Stratum1: Under-Lower stratum, Stratum2: Lower stratum, Stratum3: Medium-Low strata, Hstatus2: Near poor health status, Hstatus3: Good health status,
Hstatus4: Very good health status, Gender: 1-Female, 0-Male,SR: 1-Covered Subsidized Regimen, 0-Uncovered Subsidized Regimen and Ylive: Years living in city/Age.
Significance code: 0.05 *.
Source: Authors’ estimations
Table 5: Estimated Models: Hospitalization, Medellin 2007.
Endogenous Logit Model Endogenous Probit Model Exogenous Logit Model Exogenous Probit Model
Coef (s.d) Coef (s.d) Coef (s.d) Coef (s.d)
Variables Hosp Hosp Hosp Hosp
Age 0.0062595(0.0050941) 0.0042924(0.0040698) 0.0100162(0.0084776) 0.003896(0.0038174)
Gender 0.180569*(0.0631951) 0.1462849*(0.0583317) 0.286769*(0.1052192) 0.1336824*(0.0458008)
Age2 4.99e-06(0.0000535) 0.0000152(0.0000434) 8.14e-06(0.0000916) 0.000015(0.0000433)
Hstatus2 -0.5503371*(0.2382918) -0.5118204*(0.1083958) -0.9373642*(0.1882427) -0.50403*(.1059638)
Hstatus3 -1.36244*(0.5948511) -1.157111*(0.1117277) -2.337213*(0.1947166) -1.141863*(.1048308)
Hstatus4 -1.27147*(0.5481311) -1.094512*(0.1361939) -2.174313*(0.2673378) -1.077679*(0.1291573)
Stratum2 -0.0942849(0.120276) -0.0795144(0.0607999) -0.1859579(0.1179057) -0.0899033(0.052568)
Stratum3 -0.0850463(0.1799313) -0.0677954(0.1268729) -0.0695915(0.1490282) -0.0315762(0.0664058)
SR -0.1577207(0.8068887) -0.1210576(0.4540764) 0.0622984(0.128048) 0.0270077(0.0544089)
Intercept -1.025535(1.095032) -1.00992*(0.3534277) -2.012909*(0.2856227) -1.114131*(0.1363613)
SR SR
Age 0.0065899*(0.002295) 0.0042924*(0.0040698)
Gender 0.3187753*(0.0235331) 0.3188191*(0.0235342)
Age2 0.0000608*(0.0000294) 0.0000608*(0.0000294)
Hstatus2 -0.3113119*(0.1292009) -0.3106422*(0.1281708)
Hstatus3 -0.5357402*(0.1237821) -0.5353118*(0.1235183)
Hstatus4 -0.5759692*(0.1290383) -0.5755491*(0.1288173)
Stratum2 0.2665001*(0.0283089) 0.2664507*(0.0282806)
Stratum3 -0.7401238*(0.0339165) -0.7401441*(0.0339013)
Ylive 0.151619 *(0.0291288 ) 0.1516672*(0.0291267)
Intercept 0.5513493*(0.1308431) 0.5508877*(0.1305971)
ρ 0.1063796(0.4723848) 0.0859076(0.2583989)
Hosp: Hospitalization in the last year, Stratum1: Under-Lower stratum, Stratum2: Lower stratum, Stratum3: Medium-Low strata, Hstatus2: Near poor health status, Hstatus3: Good health status,
Hstatus4: Very good health status, Gender: 1-Female, 0-Male,SP: 1-Covered Subsidized Regimen, 0-Uncovered Subsidized Regimen, Ylive: Years living in city/Age.
Significance code: 0.05 *.
Source: Authors’ estimations
In order to evaluate Average Treatment Effects on hospitalization, we estimate bivariate Logit and Probit
models. Again, we use as an instrument the ratio of time living in neighborhood over age. The likelihood ratio test
for testing statistical significance of this variable in Logit and Probit models are 24.03 and 27.12, these values are
large relative to conventional 95% critical value for χ2c(1). As Table (5) illustrates, after controlling for selection
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bias, the subsidized health care program does not affect the probability that an individual is hospitalized. Given
that the null hypothesis ρ = 0 cannot be rejected with a z statistic in Logit and Probit endogenous switching
models, we perform likelihood ratio tests in both models; the null hypothesis ρ= 0 cannot be rejected. Thus, there
is neither selection bias nor moral hazard, and parameters estimated under univariate specification are unbiased
and consistent. We estimate univariate Logit and Probit models and find that the subsidized health care program is
no associated with hospitalization (See Table (5)).
On the other hand, the significance of the health status variables in the subsidized regimen equations indicates
that there is evidence of selection on the basis of observed health status (See Tables (5) and (4)). Users with worst
health status have a bigger probability of being in the subsidized program.
Table 6: Average Treatment Effect on the Treated: Medical care utilization, Medellin 2007.
Method
Stratification Kernel Matching Radius Matching Nearest Neighbor
Preventive ÂT ET =−0.024 ÂT ET =−0.01 ÂT ET =−0.039 ÂT ET =−0.083
ee = 0.053 ee = NA ee = 0.049 ee = 0.054
eeboostrap = 0.056 eeboostrap = 0.048 eeboostrap = 0.058 eeboostrap = 0.053
Hospitalization ÂT ET = 0.005 ÂT ET = 0.007 ÂT ET = 0.010 ÂT ET = 0.010
ee = 0.004 ee = NA ee = 0.004 ee = 0.005
eeboostrap = 0.004 eeboostrap = 0.003 eeboostrap = 0.004 eeboostrap = 0.006
Source: Authors’ estimations
We use propensity score matching to calculate the effect on preventive health care utilization and hospitaliza-
tion. We formulate a Logit model that satisfied the balancing condition in order to calculate propensity scores. We
use equation (12) to estimate the Average Treatment Effect on Treated (ÂT ET ) with different methods. Specifi-
cally, we use Nearest Neighbor, Radius Matching, Kernel Matching and Stratification Matching. As can be seen
in Table (6), the outcomes for preventive care utilization are not statistically significant at 5%. On the other hand,
there is no clear answer about (ÂT ET ) for hospitalization. Nearest Neighbor and Stratification Matching do not
find statistically significant effects, but Radius and Kernel Matching do.
5 Conclusions
Although the results are not directly comparable, the parametric and non-parametric methodologies provide ev-
idence in the same direction. Both methodologies indicate that there is no statistically significant difference in
utilization between covered and uncovered individuals of the subsidized health care program in Medellin. How-
ever, the endogenous count model indicates that there is moral hazard and self selection in preventive medical care
utilization. Specifically, the significance of the health status variables in the subsidized regime equations indicates
that there is evidence of selection on the basis of observed health status. People with self perceived poor health
status have a bigger probability of being covered by the program. This fact joined with moral hazard suggests that
there are agents which imply high costs for the program. However, favourable selection based on unobservables
relaxes the aggregate financial constraint of the program. Therefore, the subsidized health program in Medellin
would improve its coverage if mechanisms were created to lower the individual moral hazard.
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